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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Violated Mr. Alfaro's Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial
The prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument includes the following exchange:
Prosecutor:

Defense:
Prosecutor:
Defense:
Court:

[Defense counsel] in the opening told you they weren't contesting
the shooting and the death of Carlos Chavez. [Defense counsel]
stood here and told you they weren't contesting the shooting of
Carlos Chavez. The only issues is Michael the driver. Yet
[defense counsel] spent the last hour contesting the details of the
shooting. That's what his closing was doing.
Judge, for the record, I'll object to the characterization and as to
the court's rulings previously.
We just went on an hour-long red herring fishing trip.
Same objection, Judge.
You're allowed a continuing objection.

Tr. Vol. VI p. 822, ln. 17 - p. 824, ln. 6. The prosecutor's argument, particularly characterizing
defense counsel's entire closing argument as a red-herring fishing trip, went beyond asking the
jury to return a verdict based on evidence, instructions and permissible inferences. The
prosecutor's argument instead disparaged defense counsel and ridiculed Mr. Alfaro' s entire
defense thereby depriving him of his due process right to a fair trial.
In response, that State argues that the prosecutor's comment was directed at defense
arguments rather than defense counsel and, thus, was not improper. Respondent's Brief, p. 10.
Initially, the prosecutor's comments were not directed solely at defense theories. Instead, the
prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel misled the jury into thinking the defense would not
contest Carlos' shooting and that defense counsel had instead spent the past hour contesting the
shooting. In then announcing "we just went on an hour-long red herring fishing trip," the
prosecutor communicated to the jury that jury that defense counsel spent an hour distracting and
misleading them. The prosecutor thus disparaged defense counsel as well as the defense

theories.
Further, referring to a specific defense argument as a red herring focuses the
disparagement on the argument itself whereas telling the jury that defense counsel spent the past
hour misleading the jury disparaged counsel by communicating that counsel personally tried to
deceive the jury. The State urges that the proper focus under State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254
P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) is to "focus on the subject of the disparagement [counsel versus
counsel's arguments], not the quantity of arguments disparaged." Respondent's Brief, p. 10.
However, informing the jury that defense counsel took the jury on an hour-long red herring
fishing trip tells the jury to disregard counsel rather than to disregard specific theories because
they are not relevant or supported by evidence. For instance, the prosecutor's rebuttal argument
referred to the oddly placed pool of blood as a "fishing trip." C/Tr. Vol. VI p. 826, ln. 7-8. This
comment is far less problematic because it occurs in the context of a specific argument and is
accompanied by an evidence based explanation. Conversely, the complained of exchange
ridiculed the entire defense and thus encouraged the jury to disregard everything defense counsel
had said rather to reject one or more defense theories.
The prosecutor's conduct was particularly unfair because the entirety of defense counsel's
argument cannot be characterized as peripheral or simply contesting shooting of Carlos. Instead,
counsel described how there was insufficient evidence to show that the drive-by with Mr. Alfaro
allegedly at the wheel was the same drive-by that resulted in Carlos' death, that the Eastersider's
testimony that Mr. Alfaro was the driver was not credible and that the shooting was the result of
an internal Westsider conflict, not Eastside fire.
The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by telling the jury that defense counsel was trying
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to distract the jury. Although Mr. Alfaro objected, the district court did not sustain the objection
or give the jury a curative instruction. The prosecutor's comment discouraged the jury from duly
considering the numerous problems with the State's evidence, which were addressed during the
course of Mr. Alfaro's argument, and this Court cannot say that the impermissible argument did
not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the prosecutorial misconduct
deprived Mr. Alfaro of his right to a fair trial and his judgment of conviction must be vacated.
B.

There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict

As described by the State, "in the summer of 2004, the violent rivalry between Eastside
and Westside gangs in Caldwell, Idaho wrought a torrent of drive-by shootings." Respondent's
Brief, p. 5. Indeed, three such shootings were reported to the police at Harvey's house in the
month of August alone and there were at least two shootings reported the night Carlos was killed.
See Tr. Vol. VI p. 412, ln. 1 - p. 413, ln. 12; p. 709, ln. 6-23. It is safe to assume that not every
drive-by shooting was reported to police. Given this "torrent" of drive-by shootings and the
inability of the Eastside witnesses to competently identify when Mr. Alfaro allegedly drove a
vehicle carrying Richard, Evan and Arandu into Westside territory, there wasinsufficient
evidence to tie that event to the death of Carlos beyond a reasonable doubt.
None of the Eastsiders competently testified that the night Mr. Alfaro allegedly drove
around in Westside territory was the same night Carlos was killed. Significantly, Mario's
testimony and that of an investigating officer establish that he observed Evan and Arandu get into
a vehicle on an entirely different evening than the night Carlos was shot. A police officer
testified that he investigated a drive-by shooting that occurred approximately three and one half
hours before Carlos was shot, which occurred near Mario's and during which a bullet passed by
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Mario's leg. Tr. Vol. VI p. 657, In. 20 - p. 659, In. 8. Mario testified that this drive-by shooting
occurred on a different night than the night Mike and Richard picked up Arandu and Evan. Id. at
p. 260, In. 2 to 261, In. 7. Given the officer's contemporaneous documentation of the date of the
shooting at Mario's, the inescapable conclusion is that Mario observed Arandu and Evan get into
a vehicle with Mike and Richard on a night other than the one in which Carlos was shot.
When Evan met with investigators almost a year after Carlos was shot, he could not
identify the time of year he had been in the car or the time of day, other than to say it was dark.
Tr. Vol. VI p. 401, In. 21-25; p. 402, In. 1-4; p. 403, In. 8-11; p. 405, In. 21-25. Although Evan
testified about an event on "August 14," it is apparent that his testimony concerning the date was
not based on personal knowledge. Although Richard testified that he and Mike picked up Evan
and Arandu the evening of August 13, 2004, there was no foundation or basis for his belief that
the six year old event occurred on that particular date. Both Evan and Richard testified to driving
by a house in Westside territory with two, not three people standing outside and the time line
established by Richard, Evan and Mario would have placed the vehicle at Harvey's at
approximately 1:00 in the morning, not 3 :30. Other than the conclusory testimony concerning
the date, no evidence establishes that Richard and Mike picked up Evan and Arandu drove into
Westsider territory the same night Carlos was killed.
Nor can the link be derived from the Westsiders' testimony. While Harvey testified that
the vehicle that shot at his house only drove by one time and did not tum around, Sael testified
that the vehicle drove by once and then returned. Tr. Vol. VI p. 33, In. 8-21; p. 89, In. 17-25; p.
92,ln.19-25Id.atp.110,ln. 7-p.111,ln.12;p.124,ln. l-9;p.125,ln.5-23. Harvey
remembers the lights being turned off whereas Sael did not. Id. Sael said the car was going fast
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while Harvey said it was going slow. Id. Thus, nothing in the Westsider's testimony could be
used to link the vehicle involved in the drive-by shooting to the one driven by Mr. Alfaro, such as
the make or color of the vehicle or even consistent testimony about whether the vehicle turned
around or had its headlights off.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Mr. Alfaro drove a car in which
passengers shot at a Westsider's residence shortly after midnight sometime during the summer or
fall of 2004. Had Caldwell not been a gang war zone with multiple drive-by shootings that
summer, this evidence might have been constitutionally sufficient to prove that Mr. Alfaro drove
the vehicle to Harvey's residence at 3:30 a.m. on August 14. Constitutionally insufficient
evidence was presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Alfaro participated in the
drive-by shooting that claimed Carlos' life. Accordingly, his judgment of conviction must be
vacated.

C.

The District Court Abused its Discretion and Violated Mr. Alfaro's Constitutional
Rights to a Jury Trial and Due Process by Sentencing Him More Harshly Based on
His Exercise of His Right to Trial
The district court sentenced Mr. Alfaro to twenty years to life for driving the vehicle in

which Richard fired a weapon at Harvey's residence and for which Richard would be sentenced
to a unified term of fifteen years with a minimum period of confinement of six years. Tr. Vol. VI

§ 7, p. 30, In. 17-25; p. 56, In. 7-12. The district court opined that Richard's plea bargained
sentence did not serve justice but that the State was forced into those agreements because Mr.
Alfaro exercised his right to a jury trial. See Tr. Vol VI, Tab 7, p. 54, In. 22 - p. 55, In. 2. Unable
to fashion the co-defendants' sentences in a manner that sends an adequate message to "trash"
such as Mr. Alfaro, the district court took his frustration on Mr. Alfaro and punished him for
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exercising his right to trial. See id at p. 55, ln. 3-20. This disparate treatment and the district
court's sentencing was an abuse of discretion and violated Mr. Alfaro's right to a jury trial and
due process.
In response, the State notes that a disparity in sentencing among co-defendants in the
same criminal activity does not make the harsher sentence per se excessive or an abuse of
discretion and argues that there was no evidence that the district court punished Mr. Alfaro for
exercising his right to trial. Respondent's Brief, p. 13-14. To the contrary, the district court
indicated "one of the things that has weighed on this court's mind ever since there's been a
conviction is how can the court treat Mr. Alfaro any differently than the state agreed to treat Mr.
Maceda or the state agreed to treat Mr. Alaniz?" Tr. Vol VI, Tab 7, p. 55, ln 3-7. The district
court then indicated the crime involved deliberate disregard for human life (a factor present with
all the co-defendants) and expressed the need to communicate that the community cannot allow
such conduct to continue. This reasoning ties the disparity to general deterrence rather than Mr.
Alfaro's potential for rehabilitation, which would have been a legitimate reason for treating a
defendant who puts the State to its proof differently than a defendant who accepts a plea bargain.
The district court's comments reflect frustration that Mr. Alfaro's co-defendants received too
little prison time as a result of Mr. Alfaro's exercise of his right to trial and then took that
:frustration out in sentencing Mr. Alfaro.
The district court sentenced Mr. Alfaro more harshly than other more culpable parties
because he exercised his right to trial. This disparate treatment and the district court's sentencing
was an abuse of discretion and violated Mr. Alfaro's right to a jury trial and due process and his
sentence should be reversed.
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III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. Alfaro respectfully asks
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and sentences.

Respectfully submitted this

j_!j___ d a ~ 3 .
,)-R-ob_yn_F_y_f£..,__e_ _ _ _ _ __
Attorney for Michael Alfaro
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